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Are Current Owners and Usufructuaries of 
Polish Real Estate Nationalized after World 
War II Entitled to the Status of Parties to 
Reprivatization Proceedings? 
PRZEMYSŁAW SZYMCZYK0F∗  
 In a Polish proceeding seeking a finding of the invalidity of a 
nationalization decision issued under the Warsaw Decree,1F1 the 
Agricultural Reform Decree,2F2 the Nationalization of Industry Act,3F3 or 
other nationalization regulations, one of the basic determinations that 
must be made by the administrative body is the identities of the parties to 
the proceeding. In the administrative practice and the case law of the 
courts, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the positions on the 
treatment of current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of once-
nationalized properties as parties to such reprivatization proceedings—
particularly with respect to the owners of units within buildings located 
on the land in question. 
Under the first position, the only parties to the reprivatization 
proceedings are the former owners of the real estate (or their legal 
successors) and possibly the State Treasury or local governmental unit 
(most often the commune—gmina). According to the second position, in 
addition to the former owner or legal successor, anyone who holds 
 
∗ Dr. Przemysław Szymczyk is an advocate at Wardyński & Partners in Warsaw, Poland. He 
specializes in real estate law. 
 1. Dekret z dnia 26 października 1945 r. o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. 
st. Warszawy [Decree on Ownership and Use of Land in the Territory of the City of Warsaw of 
October 26, 1945] (Dz. U. 1945 nr 50 poz. 279) (Pol.). 
 2. Dekret Polskiego Komitetu Wyzwolenia Narodowego z dnia 6 września 1944 r. o 
przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej [Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation on 
Conduct of Agricultural Reform of September 6, 1944] (Dz. U. 1945 nr 3 poz. 13 t.j.) (Pol.). 
 3. Ustawa z dnia 3 stycznia 1946 r. o przejęciu na własność Państwa podstawowych gałęzi 
gospodarki narodowej [Act on Assumption of Ownership by the State of Fundamental Branches of 
the National Economy of January 3, 1946] (Dz. U. 1946 nr 3 poz. 17) (Pol.). 
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property rights to the real estate is a party to the proceeding, including the 
current owners or perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate. 
This article seeks to demonstrate that the latter position is erroneous. 
The rights of current owners and perpetual usufructuaries are duly 
protected by law on the basis of the warranty of public reliance on the 
land and mortgage register. Thus, they have no legal interest in being a 
party to reprivatization proceedings and there is no need to summon them 
to participate in such proceedings. Moreover, that approach often results 
in conducting proceedings with dozens or even hundreds of parties, 
defeating any notion of efficient adjudication and unnecessarily 
prolonging the proceedings. In many instances, this approach precludes 
any real possibility of carrying the proceedings through to completion 
(due to inheritance matters, ownership changes and the like). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Party to Administrative Proceedings and Legal Interest 
The point of departure for considering the nature of a party to 
administrative proceedings is Article 28 of the Administrative Procedure 
Code.4F4 According to that provision, a party is anyone whose legal interest 
or obligation is affected by the proceeding or who demands activity by 
the administrative body in light of his legal interest or obligation.5F5 Article 
28 does not constitute a freestanding legal norm because determination 
of a legal interest may occur in connection with a norm of substantive 
law. The nationalization regulations do not specify who may be a party 
to the proceeding, but this gap is filled by the practice of administrative 
bodies and the case law of the courts. 
According to the position adopted in the legal commentaries, 
A party within the meaning of art. 28 will be a natural or legal person 
or other organizational unit which under applicable law may or must 
obtain specific benefits, or may (or must) be charged with the 
obligation to take specific action indicated by the command or 
prohibition, but only when they are reduced to an administrative 
decision by the administrative body acting within the bounds of its 
jurisdiction and competence.6F6 
 
 4. Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1960 r. Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego [Act of 14 
June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure] (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 1257 t.j.), art. 28 (Pol.). 
 5. See id. 
 6. BARBARA ADAMIAK & JANUSZ BORKOWSKI, KODEKS POSTĘPOWANIA 
ADMINISTRACYJNEGO. KOMENTARZ [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CODE. COMMENTARY] 189 
(2009) (Pol.). 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  3:02 PM 
2018] Owners Entitled to Status of Parties? 411 
No normative act of administrative law contains a legal definition of 
interes prawny (legal interest), and thus determination of its meaning is a 
task left to legal literature and case law.7F7 
It is aptly pointed out in case law that there are no unequivocal rules 
or grounds for holding the status of a party or a legal interest under 
Article 28 which could automatically be applied in any case seeking a 
finding of the invalidity of an administrative decision (in particular a 
nationalization decision). This issue should be considered individually 
each time, responding to the question of what legal interest or obligation 
could be affected by the consequences of potentially finding the decision 
in question to be invalid.8F8 In its judgment of October 26, 1999, the 
Supreme Administrative Court stressed that “a legal interest should be 
understood as an objective and actually existing need for legal 
protection.”9F9 It is also asserted in the case law that the given entity obtains 
the status of a party in an administrative proceeding if the set of legal 
norms addressing the entity’s legal situation in the administrative 
proceeding directly affects the entity’s rights or obligations.10F10 
The source of legal interest is generally a norm of substantive law, 
deriving from any and all fields of substantive law.11F11 In civil law 
literature, the notion of a legal interest is understood to mean “an 
objective, that is truly existing, need for legal protection.”12F12 In the 
judgment of April 11, 1991, the Supreme Court of Poland held that “a 
legal interest should be considered as an objective, that is truly existing, 
need for legal protection—this is an interest of a personal nature in that it 
is one’s own, individualized and concrete, as well as currently existing.”13F13 
With respect to an administrative proceeding, “the interest must be 
personal, one’s own, individual . . . The interest must be concrete, capable 
 
 7. See ANDRZEJ SEBASTIAN DUDA, INTERES PRAWNY W POLSKIM PRAWIE 
ADMINISTRACYJNYM [LEGAL INTEREST IN POLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 184 (2008) (Pol.). 
 8. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], II OSK 347/06, Mar. 
2, 2007 (Pol.). 
 9. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA 1693/97, Oct. 26, 
1999 (Pol.). 
 10. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 349/07, Jan. 
9, 2008 (Pol.). 
 11. See WOJCIECH JAKIMOWICZ, PUBLICZNE PRAWA PODMIOTOWE [PUBLIC SUBJECTIVE 
RIGHTS] 132 (2002) (Pol.). 
 12. TADEUSZ ROWIŃSKI, INTERES PRAWNY W PROCESIE CYWILNYM I W POSTĘPOWANIU 
NIEPROCESOWYM [LEGAL INTEREST IN CIVIL TRIALS AND NON-ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS] 22 
(1971) (Pol.); see also WOJCIECH CHRÓśCIELEWKI & JAN PAWEŁ TARNO, POSTĘPOWANIE 
ADMINISTRACYJNE [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE] 52-54 (1999) (Pol.). 
 13. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III ARN 13/91, Apr. 11, 1991 (Pol.). 
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of being objectively determined, as well as current and not contingent 
. . . .”14F14 
In administrative law literature, it is stressed that a legal interest is 
often accompanied by a third party’s prawo refleksowe (reflexive right), 
and this constitutes one of the grounds for the occurrence of a legal 
interest.15F15 
B. “Reflexive Right” Held by a Third Party 
A “reflexive right” vested in a third party is tied to a situation where 
the primary holder’s subjective right may lead to infringement of norms 
of objective law which are not indifferent to the interests of a third party; 
thus, a violation justified by the interests of the third party. In particular, 
this may involve a situation where the rightsholder demands that the 
administrative authority behave in an appropriate manner.16F16 Thus, a 
reflexive right is connected with the notion of a legal interest, constituting 
one of the configurations in which a legal interest may appear. A third 
party’s reflexive right arises out of applicable law but is derived from the 
legal situation of another entity. Consequently, some commentators take 
the view that the lack of a specific legal norm directly concerning the 
rights or obligations of a third party excludes infringement of the legal 
sphere of the third party and renders any reflex legally indifferent.17F17 
It is further stressed in case law from administrative courts that a 
reflexive right obtains protection only in an administrative proceeding in 
which a ruling may be issued that conflicts with the legally protected 
interests of a third party by limiting or preventing exercise of the third 
party’s rights. As the Supreme Administrative Court held in the judgment 
of December 9, 2005: 
The characteristics of a legal interest are that it is individual, concrete, 
current and objectively verifiable, and its existence is confirmed in the 
factual circumstances that are the grounds for application of a 
provision of substantive law. An administrative proceeding affects the 
legal interest of a specific person when a decision is to be issued in the 
proceeding that determines the rights and obligations of the person, or 
the determination of the rights and obligations of another entity affects 
the person’s rights and obligations. In other words, the status of a party 
 
 14. WIT KLONOWIECKI, STRONA W POTĘPOWANIU ADMINITRACYJNYM [THE PARTY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS] 41 (1938) (Pol.). 
 15. See JAKIMOWICZ, supra note 11, at 137. 
 16. See Magdalena Maciołek, O Publicznym Prawie Podmiotowym [On public subjective 
rights], 1-2 SAMORZĄD TERYTORIALNY [S.T.] 11 (1992) (Pol.). 
 17. See WŁADYSŁAW LEOPOLD JAWORSKI, NAUKA PRAWA ADMINISTRACYJNEGO [THE 
STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 116 (1924) (Pol.). 
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in an administrative proceeding is held by a person when the person is 
directly affected by the proceeding or a ruling may be issued in the 
proceeding conflicting with the person’s legally protected interests by 
limiting or preventing exercise of the person’s rights.18F18 
It is recognized in case law and legal literature that there is no barrier 
to a legal interest arising also out of civil law. However, as stressed by 
the Supreme Administrative Court in the same December 9, 2005 
judgment, the body deciding an administrative matter must assess each 
time whether the legal interest asserted by the entity of a reflexive 
character founded in civil law “actually deserves legal protection.”19F19 The 
notion of a legal interest should be understood as an objective (i.e. 
actually existing) need for legal protection.20F20 Involvement in an 
administrative proceeding by an entity deriving its legal interest from a 
norm of civil law is justified by a threat to any personal or financial goods 
of the person. Only in that situation can it be said that the person has a 
legal interest.21F21 For example: 
The owner of neighboring real estate has a legal interest arising out of 
Civil Code article 140 to participate as a party (Administrative 
Procedure Code article 28) in administrative proceedings as a result of 
which a decision may be issued so shaping the relations on the 
neighboring property (the manner of its use) that it will affect the 
exercise of the right of ownership by the owner of the neighboring 
property.22F22 
However, in the case of a proceeding concerning elimination of a 
nationalization decision from legal circulation, the property rights of third 
parties to the nationalized real estate (e.g. Warsaw Decree property) are 
not threatened in any way. The substantive ruling by the administrative 
body—whichever way it goes—will not affect the exercise of the right of 
ownership or perpetual usufruct of third parties. The reflexive rights of 
these persons are not threatened and thus cannot receive protection in 
such proceedings because the decision issued in the matter will not 
conflict in any way with the legally protected interests of the third parties. 
It will not limit or prevent exercise of their property rights to the 
 
 18. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], II OSK 310/05, Dec. 9, 
2005, (Pol.). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], VI 
SA/Wa 24/06, May 5, 2006 (Pol.). 
 21. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], IV 
SA/Wa 916/06, Oct. 20, 2006 (Pol.). 
 22. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], OSK 682/04, Mar. 8, 
2005 (Pol.). 
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nationalized real estate. Consequently, “any reflex is legally 
indifferent.”23F23 
The rights of such third parties are indisputable and protected by the 
warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage register. Regardless 
of the result of the administrative review proceeding, they will not lose 
their rights, as was unambiguously confirmed by a resolution of a seven-
judge panel of the Supreme Court of February 15, 2011: “[t]he warranty 
of public reliance on the land and mortgage register protects the acquirer 
of perpetual usufruct also in the event of defective entry in the land and 
mortgage register of the State Treasury or local governmental unit as the 
owner of the property.”24F24 
In the judgment of September 8, 2011, the Supreme Court held that 
the principle of reliance on the land and mortgage register also covers the 
right of perpetual usufruct.25F25 Real estate may change its legal status at a 
certain time, but defective action by the State Treasury leading to a 
change in that status (in the form of taking over the real estate by, among 
other things in the form of nationalization) cannot deprive the perpetual 
usufructuary of legal protection even against the owner of the land. 
The review body decides as a cassation authority only with respect 
to the invalidity of the challenged decision (which occurs due to the 
existence of the exhaustively defined grounds set forth in Administrative 
Procedure Code Article 156 Section 1),26F26 and not as to the essence of the 
matter involving whether the nationalization of the given property was 
correct. The consequences of the review decision do not exert any direct 
legal effect limiting the currently held property right to the real estate. 
Such a decision does not give anyone rights to the real estate, and thus it 
does not result in any determination of a legal relationship in which third 
parties are participants. 
As mentioned, in the practice of administrative bodies and in the 
case law of the courts, there is a discrepancy with respect to recognizing 
third parties holding property rights to nationalized real estate as parties 
to review proceedings regarding the nationalization decisions. This 
discrepancy is indicated in the passages from the opinions of the 
administrative courts cited below. 
  
 
 23. JAWORSKI, supra note 17, at 116. 
 24. Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CZP 90/10, Feb. 15, 2011 (Pol.). 
 25. See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court], III CSK 159/09, Sep. 8, 2011 (Pol.). 
 26. See Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 156 § 1. 
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II. DISCREPANCIES IN ESTABLISHING THE PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS IN 
REPRIVATIZATION CASES 
A. Position Not Recognizing Third Parties Holding Property Rights to 
the Real Estate as Parties to Review Proceedings 
In the judgment of September 18, 2014, the Warsaw Administrative 
Court held: 
[A]dmitting entities who in reliance on the land and mortgage register 
obtained rights to the real estate from entities disclosed in the register 
to participate in the review proceeding in the matter of finding of the 
invalidity of nationalization acts is not justified by Administrative 
Procedure Code Article 28, which awards the status of a party 
exclusively to entities whose legal interest or obligation is affected by 
the proceeding . . . Such status is held in this case only by the company 
which owned the nationalized properties, the State Treasury acting via 
its statio fisci, and the local governmental unit which obtained rights 
to the real estate by way of communalization. Such status is not held 
by other entities even though they currently hold property rights to the 
real estate. Assuming purely hypothetically that the nationalization 
rulings under review were eliminated from legal circulation in the 
invalidation proceeding, such a ruling in the case, although exerting 
property law effects with respect to the State Treasury, would not 
automatically lead to restitution of the lost ownership to the enterprise 
(and in principle the appellant company). The subjective rights of the 
current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate, 
protected by the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage 
register, would not be disturbed or in any way limited as a result of a 
decision in favor of the former owners in this proceeding. In particular, 
issuance of such a decision will not lead to invalidation of the civil 
contracts concluded by them on transfer of ownership, establishment 
of the right of perpetual usufruct, or sale thereof . . . As regardless of 
the substance taken by the review ruling the rights currently held by 
entities to the real estate covered in the past by nationalization acts are 
not threatened, treatment of such entities as parties to the review 
proceeding is unwarranted.27F27 
Similar conclusions were reached by the Warsaw Administrative Court 
in its judgment of February 28, 2014: 
The court did not find in the actions of the review authorities a 
violation of Administrative Procedure Code Article 28 through 
improperly ignoring in the proceeding all entities holding property 
 
 27. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court] I 
SAB/Wa 374/14, Sept. 18, 2014 (Pol.). 
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rights to the real estate. First and foremost, the rights of these persons, 
protected by the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage 
register, will not be infringed in any way by the substance of the 
review ruling issued with respect to the ruling on taking over of the 
property for purposes of agricultural reform. Consequently, it should 
be accepted that there is no provision of substantive law which would 
give rise to a legal interest for such owners (or perpetual 
usufructuaries) entitling them to participate in the proceeding as a 
party.28F28 
In the court’s view, admitting all current owners (or perpetual 
usufructuaries) of the real estate as participants in the review proceeding 
raises doubts under Article 2 of the Polish Constitution: 
[C]onducting proceedings with all owners of plots unconnected to the 
matter, and requiring determination in each instance of the current 
legal status of such properties, in many situations will postpone for 
many years the possibility of redressing the injury done to the original 
owners of the real estate unlawfully taken over by the State. In extreme 
instances the possibility of concluding the review proceeding under 
such conditions would be purely illusory (due to changes in ownership 
relations during the course of the proceeding, approvals, the need to 
wait for inheritance proceedings to be carried out, and so on).29F29 
The Warsaw Administrative Court also pointed out in the judgment of 
October 7, 2013: 
The simple question should be posed what legal effects a potential 
finding of the invalidity of the decree ruling would have for the owners 
of units, in what manner it could affect the substance of their rights to 
their separate unit and the connected share in the real estate. The 
administrative proceeding in which the challenged order was issued 
concerns a finding of the invalidity of the decision of the Presidium of 
the National Council in . . . dated . . . 1950 refusing to award to the 
former owners the right of perpetual usufruct to the land . . . covered 
by the operation of the [Warsaw Decree] . . . That the decree 
proceeding may finally lead to establishment of the right of perpetual 
usufruct to a share unconnected to the sold units will only cause a new 
person to join the residential cooperative in place of the commune. 
However, owners of units, as joint perpetual usufructuaries, have no 
 
 28. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I 
SA/Wa 1588/13, Feb. 28, 2014 (Pol.). 
 29. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I 
SA/Wa 414/14, Mar. 8, 2005 (Pol.); appeal denied Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme 
Administrative Court], I OSK 1330/15, Mar. 17, 2017 (Pol.); accord Wojewódzki Sąd 
Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I SA/Wa 1821/13, Mar. 12, 2014 
(Pol.). 
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influence over disposal of that share by the commune. The court finds 
no regulation in the Civil Code governing exercise of the right to joint 
ownership, or in the Ownership of Units Act, which would create a 
legal interest in the owners of the units. A legal interest cannot be 
derived from the right of ownership of individual units held by such 
persons, joint ownership of common areas of the building, and a share 
in the right to the land under the building.30F30 
B. Position Recognizing Third Parties Holding Property Rights to the 
Real Estate as Parties to Review Proceedings 
In the judgment of September 23, 2015, the Warsaw Administrative 
Court held: 
[T]he parties to a proceeding in Warsaw Decree matters are not only 
the pre-decree owners or their heirs, but also anyone who holds 
property law title to the real estate, and thus the current owners and 
perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate . . . The review authority 
made an error in interpretation of Administrative Procedure Code 
Article 28, as the applicant seeking reconsideration of the case is 
entitled to the status of a party. This follows from Civil Code Article 
140 §1, which protects to an equal degree the interests of both the 
former owners of Warsaw real estate pursuing decree claims, and 
persons who later acquired ownership of real estate from the State 
Treasury. The legal interest of these persons arising under art. 3(1)–
(2) of the Ownership of Units Act of June 24, 1994 (2000 Dz. U. no. 
80 item 903, as amended), as the owners of residential units in the 
building on the Warsaw land, became co-owners of a portion of the 
building and fixtures and, in a defined fractional share, perpetual 
usufructuaries of the Warsaw land involved in this proceeding.31F31 
A similar position was taken by the Warsaw Administrative Court in the 
judgment of May 23, 2012: 
It is unquestioned that perpetual usufruct cannot be established on real 
estate that is the property of other entities, or on real estate that is held 
in undivided joint ownership of the commune and natural persons . . . 
It cannot be stated that the perpetual usufructuary does not have a 
direct legal interest in a proceeding aimed at a finding of the invalidity 
of nationalization decisions, i.e. de facto seeking to defeat the right of 
ownership of the real estate held by the State Treasury. The ruling on 
this matter has a direct effect on the legal interest of an entity holding 
 
 30. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 508/14, May 27, 
2015 (Pol.). 
 31. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I 
SA/Wa 3037/14, Sept. 23, 2015 (Pol.). 
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the right of perpetual usufruct of the real estate that is the subject of 
the proceeding. This is because removing the right of ownership of the 
real estate from the State Treasury (or local governmental unit) upsets 
the legal construction built on Civil Code Article 232 and in 
consequence may lead to removal of the right of perpetual usufruct.32F32 
In its judgment of July 9, 2015, the Supreme Administrative Court also 
adopted this view: 
[A]s the subject of this proceeding was oversight, under the review 
procedure, of a decision denying the former owner a property right to 
land in relation to which (an abstract fraction [idealna część] thereof) 
the petitioner holds the very same property right, the position that the 
petitioner is not entitled to appear in this proceeding as a party seems 
incomprehensible. This right arises under Articles 140 and 233 of the 
Civil Code. Under those provisions, within the bounds established by 
law and principles of social coexistence, the owner may, to the 
exclusion of other persons, use a thing in accordance with the 
socioeconomic purpose of his right, and in particular may dispose of 
the thing, while within the bounds established by law and principles 
of social coexistence and by the agreement delivering land of the State 
Treasury or land belonging to local governmental units or unions 
thereof in perpetual usufruct, the usufructuary may use the land to the 
exclusion of other persons.33F33 
III. WHY CURRENT OWNERS AND PERPETUAL USUFRUCTUARIES OF 
NATIONALIZED REAL ESTATE SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS PARTIES TO 
REPRIVATIZATION PROCEEDINGS 
Treating the current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of 
nationalized real estate as parties to reprivatization proceedings is one of 
the main reasons for the unusual length of these proceedings (often 
lasting a decade or more, or even several decades). This practice is 
erroneous and also contributes to a negative image of reprivatization 
because it generates among such persons a groundless fear of losing their 
property. 
A legal interest entitling one to be a party to a proceeding (in 
particular a reprivatization proceeding) does not depend on an individual 
belief that there is a connection between the proceeding and the situation 
of the interested person, but instead is of an objective nature and must 
 
 32. Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], IV 
SA/Wa 409/12, May 23, 2012 (Pol.). 
 33. Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I OSK 2527/14, July 9, 
2015, (Pol.). 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  3:02 PM 
2018] Owners Entitled to Status of Parties? 419 
derive from a statutory source.34F34 A legal interest derives from a specific 
provision of law, directly referring to the entity’s situation. It arises when 
there is a connection between the applicable norm of substantive law and 
the legal situation of the subject of the law, wherein the act of applying 
such a norm may have an influence on the situation of the entity in terms 
of substantive law.35F35 
Because old nationalization decisions issued following World War 
II did not rule on acquisition of ownership rights to the real estate by the 
current owners (or the right of perpetual usufruct by the current perpetual 
usufructuaries), setting aside such decisions (i.e. finding them to be 
invalid) does not affect the legal situation of such entities because their 
rights to the real estate derive from later acts of civil law (notarial deeds). 
Entities cannot be treated as parties to proceedings under 
extraordinary procedures, such as invalidating decisions or reopening 
proceedings. Reprivatization proceedings are an example of such 
extraordinary proceedings since it is obvious that the potential setting 
aside of the final decision cannot affect the interests of entities in any 
measure.36F36 This makes it necessary to reject the requirement of notifying 
these entities of such a proceeding. A finding of the invalidity of the 
nationalization decision will not cause the original status to be restored, 
but will only serve to remove a number of consequences of the decision’s 
being in force. Consequently, the result of the reprivatization proceeding 
does not directly impact the rights and obligations of the current owners 
and perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate, which includes the owners 
of separate units in the building located on the former property. 
In the judgment of February 11, 2011, the Supreme Court held that 
invalidating a decision refusing to award the former owners of Warsaw 
land the right of perpetual tenancy or the right to construction on the basis 
of Article 7(1) of the Warsaw Decree exerts the legal effect of restoring 
to the entitled persons the right to seek the establishment of perpetual 
usufruct as a “surrogate” for the no longer existing property rights 
provided for in Article 7(1) of the decree.37F37 However, it does not exert 
the property law effect in the form of restitution of the ownership right to 
 
 34. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], I 
SA/Wa 58/06, June 13, 2006 (Pol.). 
 35. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA/Wa 2164/97, 
June 2, 1998 (Pol.). 
 36. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], IV SA/Wa 1644/97, 
Oct. 5, 1999 (Pol.). 
 37. See Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], I CSK 288/10, Feb. 
11, 2011 (Pol.). 
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the buildings located on the land pursuant to Article 5 of the decree.38F38 
This is because it is not possible for a building that has lost its 
separateness, and become an integral part of the real estate, to then 
currently be both partly an integral element of the real estate (i.e., with 
respect to the shares connected with the sold units)39F39 and partly constitute 
separate real estate within the meaning of Article  5 of the Warsaw 
Decree. 
The rights of persons who acquired real estate arising out of the 
former nationalized property (e.g. residential units in the building located 
on the land) are irrefutable and protected by Article 21(1) of the 
Constitution and the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage 
register (Article 5 of the Act on Land and Mortgage Registers and 
Mortgages),40F40 and thus the involvement of such persons in reprivatization 
proceedings serves no purpose. Regardless of the result of the review 
proceeding, these persons will not lose their rights, as unequivocally 
confirmed by the resolution of a seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court 
in the resolution cited above of February 15, 2011.41F41 
The notarial deeds under which the current owners and perpetual 
usufructuaries acquired rights to the real estate are unassailable. The 
establishment of perpetual usufruct or ownership was not the subject of 
the challenged nationalization decisions or a result of their issuance or 
execution. These rights arose independently of the scope and effects of 
the nationalization decisions,42F42 which did not contain any determinations 
concerning the need to establish the right of perpetual usufruct or the right 
of ownership of the real estate. 
Issuance of a decision withdrawing from legal circulation the earlier 
decision (refusing to award temporary ownership of the land covered by 
the operation of the Warsaw Decree) will not lead to an authoritative 
determination of the rights and obligations of third parties. The review 
body rules as a cassation authority only with respect to the invalidity of 
the challenged decision, and not as to the merits of the case involving the 
correctness of the nationalization of the property. The review decision 
(which concludes the reprivatization proceeding) does not exert any 
direct legal effect limiting the property rights currently held to the real 
 
 38. See id. 
 39. Ustawa z dnia 24 czerwca 1994 r. o własności lokali [Ownership of Units Act of June 24, 
1994] (Dz. U. 2018 poz. 716 t.j.), art. 3(4) (Pol.). 
 40. See Ustawa o księgach wieczystych i hipotece [Act on Land and Mortgage Registers and 
Mortgages] (Dz. U. 2017 poz. 1007 t.j.) (Pol.). 
 41. See III CZP 90/10, Feb. 15, 2011. 
 42. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court], IV 
SA 4470/10, Oct. 5, 1999 (Pol.). 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  3:02 PM 
2018] Owners Entitled to Status of Parties? 421 
estate. Such a decision does not give anyone rights to the real estate and 
thus its result will not be a concrete determination of a legal relationship 
in which the third parties are participants. Such persons (i.e. the current 
owners and perpetual usufructuaries of the real estate) therefore have no 
legal interest in this proceeding because there is no regulation justifying 
such interest. 
Entities who acquired rights to the given real estate many years after 
issuance of the nationalization decisions have no influence on whether 
such decisions, issued over half a century ago, were issued in gross 
violation of law. Redress of the old injury cannot at the same time create 
either disproportionately greater new injuries to entities who have no 
connection to issuance of the unlawful ruling, or a sense of threat to such 
persons that they will lose the property they have acquired. Including 
such persons (i.e. current owners and perpetual usufructuaries of the real 
estate) in the proceeding for a finding of the invalidity of nationalization 
decisions would unnecessarily generate a concern among such persons 
over potential loss of the properties they have acquired because they are 
still protected by the warranty of public reliance on the land and mortgage 
register. 
Conducting a proceeding often involving dozens or hundreds of 
persons whose legal situation cannot change in any way regardless of the 
result in the case creates absurd waste and unnecessary confusion for 
those persons as well as an obstruction for the applicant. For the 
administrative body to involve in the case persons who have no legal 
interest in the matter and suspend the proceeding until inheritance matters 
involving them are settled, results in practice in the long-term foreclosure 
of the path to review of the defective decision under the rules set forth in 
the Administrative Procedure Code. Continual prolongation of the 
proceeding for this reason and refusal to issue a decision on the merits 
should be regarded as a violation of the regulations which established the 
principle of expeditious proceedings as well as the rule of law. In 
particular, conditioning the resolution of the case on the clarification of 
inheritance matters of persons having no connection to the review 
proceeding is unacceptable from the point of view of the rule of law. 
In light of the foregoing, the party’s right to have the case heard 
within a reasonable time under Article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR)43F43 should also be considered. Conducting a 
proceeding with the unnecessary involvement of a large number of 
owners and perpetual usufructuaries of real estate significantly prolongs 
 
 43. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 6(1) [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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the administrative review process, often resulting in exceeding the 
maximum statutory periods for resolution of matters by administrative 
bodies. This also violates the principle of the rule of law (Administrative 
Procedure Code Article 6),44F44 the principle of deepening of the citizens’ 
trust in the State,45F45 and the principle of expeditious proceedings.46F46 As is 
often stressed, the grossly long period of consideration of a matter by the 
administrative authorities, even when the result of complex 
administrative procedures, demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the State, 
which violates the citizens’ right to obtain a decision on the matter within 
a reasonable time under ECHR Article 6(1).47F47 Such lengthy proceedings 
conflict with the foundations of the rule of law and undermine citizens’ 
trust in the legal system and state institutions. 
The right to an efficient procedure aimed at quickly obtaining a 
resolution, free from delay or inaction of the competent authority of the 
State, constitutes an element of a subjective right under public law.48F48 It is 
an element of procedural justice contained within the clause on the rule 
of law set forth in Article 2 of the Polish Constitution.49F49 Moreover, this 
right is expressly stated in Article 45(1) of the Constitution 
(supplemented by Articles 77(2), 78, 173, 177 and 178(1)): “[e]veryone 
shall have the right to a fair and public hearing of his case, without undue 
delay, before a competent, impartial, and independent court.”50F50 Because 
the Constitution applies directly unless otherwise provided,51F51 
Article 45(1) applies also to administrative proceedings.52F52 
The right to a fair hearing under administrative procedure 
regulations is expressed in Administrative Procedure Code Article 12 
Section 1, which provides: “[b]odies of the public administration shall act 
in a matter thoroughly and expeditiously, using the simplest possible 
 
 44. See Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 6. 
 45. See id. art. 8. 
 46. See id. arts. 12 § 1, 35 § 1. 
 47. See ECHR, supra note 43, art. 6(1). 
 48. See Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 39/09, Oct. 18, 2011 (Pol.); 
Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], S 3/06, Oct. 30, 2006 (Pol.); Sąd Najwyższy 
[Supreme Court], III CZP 152/06, June 27, 2007 (Pol.). 
 49. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [KRP] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, 
art. 2 (Pol.); see also Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 2/09, Jan. 12, 2010 
(Pol.); see also Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny [Supreme Administrative Court], V SA 250/93, Oct. 
10, 1993 (Pol.). 
 50. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ, art. 45(1). 
 51. See id. art. 8. 
 52. Id. art. 45(1); see also PAWEL KORNACKI, SKARGA NA PRZEWLEKŁOŚĆ POSTĘPOWANIA 
ADMINISTRACYJNEGO [COMPLAINT FOR OVERLENGTHY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS] (2014) 
(Pol.). 
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means leading to resolution of the matter,”53F53 and Article 35 Section 1, 
which provides: “[b]odies of the public administration are required to 
resolve matters without undue delay.”54F54 These provisions express one of 
the fundamental principles of administrative law, alongside the principle 
of subsidiarity and proportionality, that is, the principle of efficiency. 
This principle requires bodies of the public administration to act 
efficaciously, expeditiously, effectively and economically, within the 
canon of principles of “proper action” or “good administrative 
practice.”55F55 
The principle of efficiency is one of the foundations for realization 
of another basic principle of administrative procedure, i.e. the principle 
of deepening citizens’ trust in the state, expressed in Administrative 
Procedure Code Article 8: “[b]odies of public administration shall 
conduct proceedings in a manner generating trust in public authority on 
the part of their participants.”56F56 Conducting administrative proceedings 
that often last from several years to several decades undoubtedly 
undermines this principle. 
An essential role in interpreting the substance of the right to an 
effective and expeditious proceeding is played by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg57F57 under ECHR Article 
6(1) cited above, which provides: “[i]n the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”58F58 As an 
international agreement concerning freedoms, rights or obligations of 
citizens as specified in the Constitution,59F59 pursuant to Article 91(1)–(2) 
of the Constitution in connection with Article 241(1), the ECHR 
constitutes part of the domestic legal order with precedence over any 
statute if it is not reconcilable.60F60 Although ECHR Article 6(1) refers 
expressly to civil and criminal proceedings, under Article 45(1) of the 
 
 53. Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 12 § 1. 
 54. Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 35 § 1. 
 55. See ROBERT SUWAJ, SĄDOWA OCHRONA PRZED BEZCZYNNOŚCIĄ ADMINISTRACJI 
PUBLICZNEJ [JUDICIAL PROTECTION AGAINST INACTION BY THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION] (2014); 
see also JAN  ZIMMERMANN, PRAWO ADMINISTRACYJNE [ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 92 (2010). 
 56. Act of 14 June 1960 Code of Administrative Procedure, art. 8. 
 57. On this subject the Constitutional Tribunal directly relies on the standards developed by 
the ECHR. See, e.g., Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], SK 10/00, Apr. 2, 2001 
(Pol.); Trybunał Konstytucyjny [Constitutional Tribunal], P 49/06, Feb. 19, 2008 (Pol.). 
 58. ECHR, supra note 43, art. 6(1). 
 59. See KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ, art. 89(1)(2). 
 60. See id. arts. 91, 241. 
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Polish Constitution it also applies in administrative proceedings and is 
fundamentally important in shaping them.61F61 
In Helwig v. Poland, a reprivatization case involving return of an 
enterprise nationalized in 1958, the ECHR reiterated that the 
reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in light of 
the circumstances of the case and with reference to the complexity of the 
case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what 
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute.62F62 There, the ECHR found 
that although the case displayed some degree of complexity, this in itself 
did not justify the overall length of the proceedings—nearly fourteen 
years.63F63 In the court’s view, the circumstances of the case, along with the 
overall length of the proceedings, the applicant’s advanced age, and the 
importance of the case for the applicant, sufficed for the court to find that 
the applicant’s case was not heard within a reasonable time, thus violating 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR.64F64 In another judgment, Trzaskalska v. Poland, 
the ECHR found that one of the reasons for violation of Article 6(1) of 
the ECHR was that the deadline for resolution of the case was extended 
several times because the authorities were not in a position to complete 
the examination of the case within the established times.65F65 
Under the facts forming the foundation for the ECHR judgment in 
Czajkowska v. Poland, which concerned claims for compensation for 
nationalized real estate which passed to the ownership of the State 
Treasury pursuant to the Warsaw Decree, it took the authorities seventeen 
years to calculate and pay compensation to the former owners or their 
heirs.66F66 The circumstances of the case, and in particular, the grossly long 
time it took state bodies to calculate and pay compensation, led the court 
to find that “the applicants have already had to bear an excessive burden 
which has upset the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
demands of the public interest and the protection of the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions.”67F67 Thus the court held that there was a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR.68F68 
 
 61. See KORNACKI, supra note 52. 
 62. See Helwig v. Poland, App. No. 33550/02 (2008). 
 63. See id. ¶¶ 14, 46-47. 
 64. See id; see also Puchalska v. Polska, App. No. 10392/04 (2009); Wilczyński v. Polska, 
App. No. 35760/060 (2008); Derda v. Polska, App. No. 58154/08 (2010). 
 65. See Trzaskalska v. Poland, App No. 34469/05 (2009) (finding that the case was not 
resolved in a reasonable time, lasting over eight years). 
 66. See Czajkowska v. Poland, App. No.16651/05 (2010). 
 67. Id. ¶ 62. 
 68. See id. 
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The case law of the Strasbourg court should also be consulted for 
interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union,69F69 which provides: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the 
Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established 
by law.70F70 
Judicial review of administrative acts is also covered by 
Recommendation Rec(2004)20 adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe on December 15, 2004.71F71 In creating standards 
for all constitutive aspects of the right to a fair trial, it formulates five 
general rules, within which the right to “a fair hearing” includes the 
requirement (assessed in light of ECHR case law) that the case should be 
decided at the administrative stage (prior to judicial proceedings) within 
a reasonable time.72F72 
IV. LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Reprivatization proceedings for current owners, usufructuaries, and 
others who hold property rights to once-nationalized real estate also arise 
in other legal systems, particularly in other Central and Eastern European 
countries which shared similar historical experiences with Poland. 
The solutions adopted in these countries, whether expressly 
provided for in regulations or established through administrative and 
judicial practice, may be categorized into three groups as follows: 
 
 69. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 02. The 
charter is regarded as a source of primary EU law. See Monika Lejcyk, System źródeł prawa 
unijnego po Traktacie Lizbońskim [System of sources of EU law following the Treaty of Lisbon], 2 
REV. OF PUB. L. 78 (2011) (Pol.). See Nina Półtorak, Rozsądny termin postępowania, in KARTA 
PRAW PODSTAWOWYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ: KOMENTARZ [EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS: COMMENTARY] 1250-1251 (Andrzej Wróbel ed., 2013), and Andrzej Wróbel, Karta Praw 
Podstawowych jako część krajowych porządków prawnych [Charter of Fundamental Rights as a 
part of national legal orders], 6 EUROPEJSKI PRZEGLĄD SĄDOWY [E.C.R], 1 (2012), for a more 
extensive discussion on the right to effective legal measures, including in the context of 
consideration of the case in a reasonable time, guaranteed in this provision. 
 70. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 69, art. 47. 
 71. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RECOMMENDATION REC (2004) 20 OF THE COMMITTEE OF 
MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS (2004). https://
eos.cartercenter.org/uploads/document_file/path/61/CoE_Committee_of_Ministers_Rec_2004__2
0__EN.pdf. 
 72. See KORNACKI, supra note 52. 
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1) Property currently held by a third party cannot be the subject of 
restitution in kind and therefore such an entity cannot participate in the 
proceeding as a party; 
2) The current owner of the property may appear as a party to 
reprivatization proceedings only if the owner acquired rights to the real 
estate in bad faith; and 
3) The current owner of the property may join the proceeding as a 
party only after demonstrating a legal interest and obtaining the consent 
of the body conducting the proceeding, but such person’s rights in the 
proceeding are fairly limited. 
For example, in Slovakia, under Section 6 of the Act on Restitution 
of Ownership of Land of December 2, 2003, ownership of real estate 
cannot be restored if the real estate is currently owned by another natural 
or legal person.73F73 Thus, reprivatization proceedings are not possible if the 
former owner of the real estate could be a party. The Act on Change in 
Ownership of Land of June 24, 1991 provides an exception to this rule.74F74 
Under Section 6, it was possible to return real estate to an entity or person 
who could participate in the reprivatization proceedings as a party, but 
only if the title to the property had been obtained unlawfully (particularly 
as a result of unlawful expropriation). However, the filing period to apply 
for the return of property under that provision expired at the end of 
1992.75F75 
In Estonia as well, the current owners or usufructuaries of real estate 
are not parties to proceedings concerning previously nationalized real 
estate. Under Section 12(3) of the Principles of Ownership Reform Act 
of June 13, 1991, unlawfully expropriated property is not subject to return 
if the property is owned by a natural person in good faith.76F76 Similarly, 
under Section 6(2) of the Land Reform Act of October 17, 1991,77F77 land 
is not subject to return if it has been granted in usufruct to another natural 
person. Former owners of real estate or their legal successors can only 
seek compensation for nationalization of their property, and only they can 
 
 73. See Zákon o navrátení vlastníctva k pozemkom ao zmene a doplnení zákona Národnej 
rady Slovenskej republiky [Act on Restitution of Ownership of Land of December 2, 2003] (No. 
503/2003) (Slovk.). 
 74. See Zákon o úprave vlastníckych vzťahov k pôde a inému poľnohospodárskemu majetku 
[Act on Change in Ownership of Land of June 24, 1991] (No. 229/1991) (Slovk.). 
 75. See id. § 6. 
 76. See Eesti Vabariigi omandireformi aluste seadus [Principles of Ownership Reform Act of 
June 13, 1991] § 12(3) (RT 1991, 21, 257) (Est.). 
 77. See Eesti Vabariigi maareformi seadus [Land Reform Act of October 17, 1991] § 6(2) (RT 
1991, 34, 426) (Est.). 
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be parties to such proceedings. Current owners or usufructuaries do not 
qualify as parties. 
In Lithuania, the basis for reprivatization is the Law on the 
Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership 
to Existing Real Property of June 18, 1991.78F78 Under Article 2 of that Act, 
the party to reprivatization proceedings is the former owner of real estate 
or his legal successors. If it is impossible to return the actual property for 
practical or legal reasons, the former owner shall receive financial 
compensation.79F79 The Act does not provide for the possibility of restitution 
of real estate that has been acquired by third parties in good faith. If, 
however, the property is occupied by residential tenants, the property may 
be restored, and then the party who has regained the property joins the 
lease as the landlord. This law was supplemented by the Law on 
Restoration of the Rights of Ownership of Citizens to Existing Real 
Property of July 1, 1997.80F80 
In Latvia, until 2004, reprivatization proceedings were conducted 
pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Procedure Act of October 14, 1998,81F81 
which governed participation in proceedings by third parties. Current 
owners of real estate could join proceedings as a party only if they 
demonstrated a legal interest and the body conducting the proceeding 
consented; even then, however, their rights in such proceedings were 
fairly limited. Since 2004, reprivatization proceedings have been 
conducted under Chapter 28 of the Administrative Procedure Act of 
October 25, 2001,82F82 which provides rules governing the participation of 
third parties in such proceedings similar to the previous rules. A current 
owner of real estate may join proceedings as a party only upon 
demonstration of a legal interest and with the prior consent of the body 
conducting the proceeding. In administrative practice, the authorities 
rarely recognize such owners as parties to reprivatization proceedings. 
In Ukraine, it was originally impossible to return nationalized 
property to the former owners or their legal successors. This was provided 
for in the Act on Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression of 
 
 78. See Dėl piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą atstatymo tvarkos ir sąlygų 
[Law on the Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership to Existing 
Real Property of June 18, 1991] (No. I-1454) (Lith.). 
 79. See id. art. 1. 
 80. See Lietuvos Respublikos piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą 
atkūrimo įstatymas [Law on Restoration of the Rights of Ownership of Citizens to Existing Real 
Property of July 1, 1997] (No. VIII-359) (Lith.). 
 81. See Civilprocesa likums [Civil Procedure Act] (1387/1391) (Lat.). 
 82. See Administratīvā procesa likums [Administrative Procedure Law] ch. 28 (Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 164 (2551)) (Lat.). 
FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2018  3:02 PM 
428 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:3 
April 17, 1991, which is no longer in force.83F83 Currently, under new 
regulations, such a possibility does exist, subject to certain restrictions. 
For example, real estate cannot be returned if: (i) it has been acquired by 
third parties, (ii) it has been rebuilt at a cost exceeding its original value, 
or (iii) it is being used for public purposes (e.g. as a hospital). If real estate 
cannot be returned in kind, the former owners or their legal successors 
will receive appropriate compensation, and as a rule, the current owners 
or users of the real estate are not parties to compensation proceedings. 
V. SUMMARY 
The issue of the treatment of current owners and usufructuaries of 
nationalized real estate as parties to review proceedings is vitally 
important for reprivatization. It is one of the main reasons for the great 
lengthiness of these proceedings, often lasting a decade or more. This 
practice can deprive the former owners of the right to expeditious 
resolution of their case and redress of the injury they suffered in the past, 
sometimes preventing the case from ever being completed. Moreover, 
summoning the current owners and usufructuaries of property to 
participate in reprivatization proceedings builds an unfavorable image of 
reprivatization proceedings, generating among such persons a groundless 
fear of loss of their property. Such a proceeding will at most result in 
payment of compensation by the State Treasury or commune to the 
previous owners (or their legal successors) and not return of the property, 
because such property was effectively acquired by the current owners and 
perpetual usufructuaries. 
Against this background, a split has developed in the practice of 
administrative bodies and the case law of the courts. But it must be 
stressed that the rulings recognizing third parties holding property rights 
to the real estate as parties to review proceedings are often limited to a 
finding that these persons are parties to the administrative proceedings in 
question. In these rulings it is typically not explained how the 
determination by the administrative body concerning the nationalization 
decision could disturb the property rights of third parties to the former 
real estate. 
In extreme situations, treatment of all the current owners and 
perpetual usufructuaries of nationalized real estate as parties to the 
proceedings will lead to absurd consequences. An example is the 
notorious reprivatization case in the village of Michałowice, near 
 
 83. See Pro reabiliatsiyu zhertv politichnikh repressiv na Ukraini [Act on Rehabilitation of 
Victims of Political Repression of April 17, 1991] (No. 962-XII) (Ukr.). 
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Warsaw, where petitions were filed by 211 people, and the total number 
of participants in the proceeding reached 1,467.84F84 It is difficult to conduct 
proceedings under such conditions. This refers not only to the need to 
serve copies of pleadings on such a large number of people and to conduct 
hearings with such a large group, but also the risk of constant suspension 
of the proceeding due to ownership changes or waiting for inheritance 
cases to be conducted. Situations of this type are the very negation of 
procedural economy and also stir negative social emotions. Moreover, 
the grossly long period for resolving the matter demonstrates the state’s 
ineffectiveness, which infringes the citizen’s right to obtain a ruling 
within a reasonable time, as provided in the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
Entities who have acquired the right of ownership or perpetual 
usufruct of real estate many years after issuance of nationalization 
decisions have no influence over whether decisions from more than half 
a century ago were issued in gross violation of law. In redressing old 
losses, disproportionate harm cannot be done to the new owners, 
particularly if they had no connection with issuance of the unlawful 
decisions. 
The problem analyzed here has been effectively resolved in other 
legal systems, particularly in neighboring countries with historical 
experiences in this area similar to Poland’s. There appears to be no reason 
similar methods cannot be applied in Poland. It should be stressed that 
these solutions have been implemented in other countries not only via 
regulations, but also through administrative and judicial practices. 
 
 
 84. See Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Warszawie [Warsaw Administrative Court] I 
SA/Wa 493/14, Sept. 21, 2016 (Pol.). 
